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In this article we introduce the hypothesis that neuropsychological adolescent
maturation, and in particular emotional management, may have opposing explanations
depending on the interpretation of the assumed brain architecture, that is, whether a
componential computational account (CCA) or a dynamic systems perspective (DSP)
is used. According to CCA, cognitive functions are associated with the action of
restricted brain regions, and this association is temporally stable; by contrast, DSP
argues that cognitive functions are better explained by interactions between several
brain areas, whose engagement in specific functions is temporal and context-dependent
and based on neural reuse. We outline the main neurobiological facts about adolescent
maturation, focusing on the neuroanatomical and neurofunctional processes associated
with adolescence. We then explain the importance of emotional management in
adolescent maturation. We explain the interplay between emotion and cognition under
the scope of CCA and DSP, both at neural and behavioral levels. Finally, we justify
why, according to CCA, emotional management is understood as regulation, specifically
because the cognitive aspects of the brain are in charge of regulating emotion-related
modules. However, the key word in DSP is integration, since neural information from
different brain areas is integrated from the beginning of the process. Consequently,
although the terms should not be conceptually confused, there is no cognition without
emotion, and vice versa. Thus, emotional integration is not an independent process
that just happens to the subject, but a crucial part of personal growth. Considering
the importance of neuropsychological research in the development of educational and
legal policies concerning adolescents, we intend to expose that the holistic view of
adolescents is dependent on whether one holds the implicit or explicit interpretation of
brain functioning.
Keywords: emotion regulation, executive functions, integration, personal identity, socialization
INTRODUCTION
Unraveling the structure and function of the brain is still a challenge for most psychologists
and philosophers of mind. Any empirical approach is underpinned by an interpretation of brain
functioning, either explicit or implicit. In this paper we argue that neuropsychological adolescent
maturation may have opposing explanations depending on the interpretation of the assumed
brain architecture. To prove this assertion, we will first explain the two most common accounts
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of brain organization. They are overtly divergent because one
proposes that the brain is divided into functionally specified
modules, while the other defends the idea that the brain is a
dynamic complex system and that functionality emerges from the
whole. Note that the former assumes some interaction between
modules, although this occurs at the end of the process, that is,
after each brain area−or module−has taken care of its function.
Conversely, in the latter, interaction happens at the beginning of
the process, and there is no single function where the activity of
the whole brain is not relevant. Therefore, we hypothesize that the
understanding of emotional management is different according
to the underlying comprehension of brain functioning. This
hypothesis can be subdivided into two additional sub-hypotheses:
(i) if the modular view is accepted, the key fact in emotional
management is the regulation of the emotional module by the
cognitive module; (ii) if the systemic view is accepted, the key fact
is that emotional and cognitive information is integrated at the
beginning of the process. In this paper, regulation is understood
as bringing emotion−or the neural activity of ‘emotion-related’
brain areas− under the control of cognition −or the neural
activity of ‘cognition-related’ brain areas−. On the other hand,
integration involves that cognition and emotion are continuously
interacting, so there is no cognition without emotion, and vice
versa.
After explaining these two interpretations in some detail, we
will describe the main neurobiological facts about adolescent
maturation. We will first outline the hormonal processes
underlying the beginning of adolescence, and then summarize the
neuroanatomical and neurofunctional changes that characterize
the transition from childhood to adolescence. Next, we will
highlight the importance of emotional management in adolescent
development, at both a behavioral and neurobiological level.
We will also develop our main claim: divergent accounts
of brain functioning result in opposing interpretations of
neurobiological development, and lead to different models of
emotional management. In our opinion, revealing these two
global interpretations, the theoretical background in which they
are rooted, and their consequences is important for present and
future legal and educational policies for adolescents.
TWO ACCOUNTS OF BRAIN
FUNCTIONING: COMPONENTIAL AND
SYSTEMIC
While a discrete classification of all the views of brain functioning
on offer may be unfair and in any case implausible, two
views are overtly divergent: the componential computational
account (CCA) and the dynamical systems perspective (DSP).
The former is the most deeply rooted and widespread in
experimental neuroscience, while the latter has recently been
applied to psychology and neuroscience. Although CCA was
founded much earlier, Fodor’s (1983) theory of modularity has
been very influential on its recent development. The main idea
is that some cognitive functions are modular, which means that
they are domain-specific, automatic, fast, and informationally
encapsulated. Although this is a modular explanation of the
mind, it can be directly applied to the brain in as much as
modules have a concrete brain correlate. Thus, according to
CCA the brain is composed of different modules that interact
with those to which are anatomically or functionally coupled.
Interestingly, Fodor (2000) argues that cognitive functions other
than perception and language could be non-modular; although
other authors defend a massive modular theory (Pinker, 1997).
From a neural point of view, the most common conclusion
under the scope of CCA is the association of a brain area with
a particular function. In this sense, neuroimaging methods are
the most common resource for supporting the strict association
between a brain area and a particular function. This is why some
authors have warned about the danger of using neuroimaging to
promote a “new phrenology” (Poldrack, 2010). Therefore, one
of the main characteristics of a CCA of the mind and brain
is temporal stability, that is, the nearly permanent association
between selective brain areas, as well as a stable identification of a
region with a particular function.
The DSP, however, argues that the brain is a complex dynamic
system rather than a group of interacting modules. This means
that it “follows principles of self-organization in which global
states might be characterized in terms of collective variables
that follow a dynamic capable of generating enormous human
behavioral complexity” (Kelso, 1995). As Anderson (2015) has
stated in a recent book, the main reason why a brain is not
analogous with a computer is that the former has an intrinsic
dynamic, whereas the latter is inactive while waiting for the
user’s order. The brain’s intrinsic dynamic is also known as the
“resting state” of the brain, which is the activity pattern that
the brain has “by default.” Given the relevance of this issue for
the dynamic systemic view of the brain, we review the main
changes in the brain’s resting state during adolescence in Section
“Neurofunctional Development.” Hence, from DSP, the brain’s
response to a stimulus is a deviation of its intrinsic dynamics that
should be understood as a whole, even though some regions could
have a tendency to be more engaged in responding to certain
kinds of stimuli. This dispositional tendency is characterized by
Anderson as an interactive differentiation, which means that brain
areas tend to differentiate across development in order to perform
a particular type of function. However, differentiation is not as
restrictive as specialization, since the former allows a relatively
fast re-acquisition of a new function when the context changes.
Anderson explains interactive differentiation by reference to past
research that shows a “relatively rapid crossmodal recruitment of
occipital cortex to process tactile information” (Merabet et al.,
2008). Moreover, Anderson (2010) defends neural reuse as the
cornerstone of the functional anatomy of the brain. He explains
its main characteristics and differences with respect to neural
plasticity as follows: “According to neural reuse, circuits can
continue to acquire new uses after an initial or original function is
established; the acquisition of new uses need not involve unusual
circumstances such as injury or loss of established function [as
in plasticity]; and the acquisition of a new use need not involve
(much) local change to circuit structure [as in plasticity] (e.g., it
might involve only the establishment of functional connections
to new neural partners)” (Anderson, 2010). In a similar way,
Pessoa (2013) mentions “temporal assemblies.” This means that
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brain regions, even individual neurons, may engage in many
different types of tasks. For example, it is reported that Broca’s
region is activated more in non-language than in language tasks
(Poldrack, 2006). Remarkably, brain functioning is understood
under DSP as context-dependent, since temporal assemblies of
brain areas have different constraints depending on both the
internal−intrinsic dynamics−and external−particular situation
of the agent−context.
In summary, according to CCA cognitive functions are
associated with the activity of restricted brain regions, and
this association is temporally stable; by contrast, DSP argues
that cognitive functions are better explained by interactions
between several brain areas, whose engagement in particular
functions is context-dependent and based on neural reuse. Its
main principle is the emergence of perception and behavior
through the global activity of the brain (Tognoli and Kelso, 2014).
From a neuroanatomical point of view, some interpretations
of DSP may allow modularity and brain functional segregation
(Bullmore and Sporns, 2009). However, modularity is understood
here as a transient characteristic of the whole system, which
fulfills the conditions of being context-dependent and relying
on neural reuse (Anderson, 2010). This is different from the
modular organization of the brain and mind that CCA defends,
since according to the latter modules are specialized and fixed
at some point of brain development. There is unquestionably
some interaction between modules, but there is a crucial
nuance: whereas in CCA functions are defined before the
interaction (for example, a cognitive module interacts with an
emotional module), in DSP functions emerge after the interaction
between brain areas (for example, the interaction between the
occipital cortex and the postcentral gyrus is involved in tactile
discrimination in blindfolded participants). The divergence
between these interpretations is clearly explained in Interlude 1
of Anderson’s book (Anderson, 2015). For the past 20 years, the
trend in neuroimaging has been selectivity, i.e., demonstrating
that a brain area is selectively active in a particular task.
However, different tools have been developed in recent years
(for example, Cognitive Neuroscience 2.0 by Yarkoni et al.,
2010) to evaluate the various tasks that recruit a particular
brain area, and all the reported areas that are recruited by
a particular task. This type of meta-analyses reveals that the
association between concrete areas and certain functions are
not restricted. According to Anderson, this is an evolutionary
strategy that makes complete sense: it is more effective to
use and reuse different brain areas for specific immediate
context-dependent purposes than developing new masses of
brain tissue for emerging functions. On the other hand, many
studies demonstrate that focal lesions seem to be associated
with selective functional impairments. Focusing on emotion-
related cases, bilateral damage in the amygdala has been linked
to specific problems with fear processing (see, for example,
Adolphs et al., 1994). This would support CCA and anatomical
modularity. However, Anderson defends the idea that neural
reuse can also account for these examples, and that this specific
relationship between structure and function can be also explained
from a non-modular perspective (Anderson, 2010). In fact,
there are also studies on amygdala lesions that do not report
impairments in fear-related behavior (Feinstein et al., 2013, for
instance).
Having explained these two opposing accounts of brain
functioning and architecture, in the following section we will
outline the main neurobiological facts of adolescent maturation.
We will then interpret these facts under the scope of CCA
and DSP, and explain adolescent emotional management in the
context of neurobiological development and both views of brain
organization.
NEUROBIOLOGY OF ADOLESCENT
MATURATION: A BRIEF REVIEW
Beginning and End of Adolescent
Development
Adolescent development begins due to hormonal changes. It
is characterized by three events: adrenarche, gonadarche, and
activation of the growth axis (Blakemore et al., 2010). These
hormonal changes trigger a new configuration of the brain, which
is progressively settled depending on the adolescent’s behavior.
How does the process end? Although it obviously depends on
biological processes as well, these can be accelerated or delayed
by stress (Hensch and Bilimoria, 2012; Callaghan et al., 2013),
social factors (Blakemore, 2008; Crone and Dahl, 2012), genetics,
lifestyle, past experiences, and personal decisions (Blakemore,
2008; Schott et al., 2011). This means that the maturational
window of adolescence may remain open in abnormal situations
(Choudhury et al., 2012; Giedd, 2012). One of the main messages
of this section is that development during adolescence entails a
plethora of processes that interact with each other. Therefore,
development should be interpreted as a global rather than a
domain-related process.
Neuroanatomical Development
Regarding neuronal and synaptic development during
adolescence, the prefrontal cortex grows significantly with
respect to the rest of the frontal cortex (Kanemura et al.,
2014). This is of great importance, since this cortical region is
fundamental in typically human behavior (Fuster, 2001; van
den Heuvel and Sporns, 2011; de Reus and van den Heuvel,
2014). Adolescence is a time of synaptic pruning, when those
synapses that are in use are strengthened, and those unused
are lost (Huttenlocher and Dabholkar, 1997; Powell, 2006;
Blakemore, 2008); therefore, the subject’s behavior is essential
in neuroanatomical development. Another interesting finding
is that, whereas axonal development is mostly linear during
adolescence, the increase in synaptogenesis in certain aspects
of the prefrontal, parietal, and temporal cortices is quadratic
(Blakemore and Choudhury, 2006; Dennis and Thompson,
2013). Concerning white matter development, the myelin layer
of axons is engrossed and subsequently neural communication
is faster and more effective (Hartline and Colman, 2007).
As happens in the case of gray matter, the development
of white matter is differential depending on the brain area
concerned (Dennis and Thompson, 2013). For example, the
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axons connecting the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex
are fully myelinated by the first year of age; however, fibers
between the hippocampus and the parahippocampal cortex
are myelinated during adolescence (Benes, 1989; Benes et al.,
1994). The functional meaning of this finding seems to be an
enhanced development of semantic memory during adolescence
(Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997; Ramos, 2013). The hippocampal
connections with the amygdala are also strengthened (LaBar and
Cabeza, 2006), contributing to the maturation of limbic circuits.
There is also an important progression in the neural substrate of
attention, due to the development of the fibers connecting the
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and temporal areas, in addition
to the projections between the anterior cingulate, parietal, and
occipital cortices (Schott et al., 2011). These attention-related
processes allow the lateral prefrontal cortex to disengage from
well-known tasks and to supervise novel actions (Velanova et al.,
2008). Once again, considering neuroanatomical development,
it seems that growth−in a broad sense−during adolescence
involves mutual relationships between cognitive and emotional
processes.
Neurofunctional Development
The neuroanatomical changes mentioned above are related
to the development of different functional features, such as
memory, judgment, temporal discounting of rewards, cognitive
interpretation of emotions, decision making, response to salient
stimuli, and socialization. It is worth noting that the development
of each of these processes is not independent; they are
intertwined with one another. We will now summarize the
main neurofunctional changes associated with these processes,
emphasizing those more closely related to emotion and cognition.
In the course of adolescence, there is a significant
maturation of memory. This involves, among other issues,
the development of semantic memory−associated with the
perirhinal cortex−away from episodic memory−associated
with the hippocampus (Ofen and Shing, 2013). Interestingly,
there is a complete maturation of the process of remembering,
which becomes a global operation involving the whole person.
In addition to memory, there is a development in the temporal
devaluation of rewards. This process is an indicator of impulsivity
(Anokhin et al., 2015) and is relevant for emotional management,
since higher delay-discounting (i.e., short-term impatience) is
associated with lower emotional stability (neuroticism; Manning
et al., 2014). At a behavioral level, recent research reveals
a high test–retest correlation in a delay-discounting task in
adolescents, even though the measures were taken 2 years apart.
Interestingly, together with this correlation, the authors found
a significant decrease in temporal devaluation in the two-year
interval (Anokhin et al., 2015). Moreover, there is a development
of temporal discounting during adolescent maturation, since
the prefrontal cortex will attenuate the hyperactivation of the
nucleus accumbens in reward anticipation (Somerville and
Casey, 2010). As a result, temporal delay is not such a strong
devaluator of rewards in adults as it is in adolescents. In turn,
van den Bos et al. (2015) recently reported that an age-related
decrease in impatience was associated with an increased
negative functional coupling between the right dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex and the striatum. These results show that
temporal discounting is an impulsivity-related trait that changes
progressively during adolescence, and that these behavioral
changes have a neurobiological correlate.
During adolescence, there is also a development of executive
functions such as judgment. The progressive increase in activity
of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in these situations enhances
control of the amygdala and insula, which boosts cognitive
re-evaluation−the re-interpretation of emotions. In a similar
way, limbic-related regions such as the anterior cingulate and
insula show decreased activity with age−within adolescence−in
stressing situations, suggesting a more sober evaluation of events
(Pitskel et al., 2011). In fact, this down-regulation of the anterior
cingulate and insula is more common in socially successful
youngsters who turn out to be more resilient adults (Blakemore
and Choudhury, 2006). These authors relate this fact with
the ability to simulate and predict conflictive scenarios, thus
rehearsing possible solutions. But this developmental feature not
only includes limbic areas, but also ‘cognitive-related’ regions,
since it is also related to the incremental association with
age between the parietal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(Blakemore and Choudhury, 2006). This cognitive-emotional
integration is also evident in the interaction between the
amygdala, hippocampus, ventromedial, lateral, and dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex in the maturation of objective judgment
(Blakemore, 2008; Baumgartner et al., 2013; Ertl et al., 2013).
Similar players are involved in the progressively increased control
of personal affectation after salient stimuli. The ability to control
the autonomic response in these situations, which is clearly
more developed in adults than adolescents, is related to the
influence of the dorsolateral prefrontal and anterior cingulate
cortices on the anterior insula (Strang et al., 2011). Besides this,
the interaction between the anterior cingulate cortex and the
basolateral amygdala increases over the course of adolescence,
correlating with a better control of anxiety (Cunningham et al.,
2002).
As an additional note we would like to draw attention to the
fact that, in general, all these tasks require an activation of the
prefrontal cortex in adolescents, whereas in adults this activation
is located in most posterior−parietal or temporal−regions. As
a consequence, the prefrontal cortex is available for demanding
cognitive tasks in adults, which can be considered an acquired
disposition for successful performance (Bernacer and Murillo,
2014; Orón, 2014).
Finally, we will briefly summarize the main changes that
occur in the resting state of the brain during adolescence. As
Johnson (2011) wrote, “while we have some good examples of
functional brain development at the level of individual cortical
regions, we are still largely in the dark about how the larger
scale of cortical function in terms of networks of regions
develops.” Johnson cites the work of Fair et al. (2007, 2009)
to summarize the main differences in resting state between
adolescents and adults: a decreased short-range connectivity,
and an increased long-range connectivity. Anderson explains
this in terms of his interactive differentiation and search:
both phenomena allow the configuration of transient neural
assemblies involving proximal and distal groups of neurons, as
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well as increasing the scope of tasks with which these groups
may be associated (Anderson, 2015). More recent work shows
that the main functional networks of the brain are fully organized
during childhood, while functional coupling between networks
is developed during adolescence (Marek et al., 2015). This
progressive maturation of the brain is related, according to the
authors, to cognitive control (the ability to execute goal-directed
behavior).
These are the main neurobiological events that affect
youngsters during adolescence. This review, although short, is
thorough. Our main intention is to demonstrate that adolescent
neurodevelopment is not restricted to a particular set of brain
areas, but is a rather global process that involves all types of
neural information−cognitive, sensorimotor and limbic. Whole-
brain changes seem to be necessary for an adequate maturation.
However, these neurobiological facts may have a different
interpretation in DSP and CCA: according to the former, all
changes happen as dynamic interrelated processes, whereas the
latter defends a domain-related maturation and a subsequent
relation between domains. In the next section, we will discuss the
importance of emotional management in adolescent maturation,
as it has been highlighted by several currents in psychology.
Furthermore, we will explain how emotional management is
viewed from CCA and DSP, giving rise to very different
interpretations.
ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND
EMOTIONAL MANAGEMENT
Each stage in life brings its own challenges: moving forward or
bearing one’s own maturational deficiencies is at stake (Marcia
and Josselson, 2013). This view of a gradual development with
identifiable stages can be found in important theories such as
Piaget’s (1974), on cognition, Kohlberg’s (1973), on morality, and
Erikson’s (1998), on global personal development. Adolescent
maturation as a stage in the development of personal identity
has been also studied from a neuropsychological perspective
(Meeus et al., 2002; Sebastian et al., 2008; Kroger et al., 2010;
Crone and Dahl, 2012; Konrad et al., 2013; Luyckx et al., 2013).
Therefore, all the neuroanatomical processes that occur during
adolescence should be understood in the context of the global
development of personal identity. Although identity maturation
does not start in adolescence, there is an initial re-elaboration of
identity during this period of life. Besides this, there are two other
maturational processes of special importance in adolescence:
socialization and the development of executive functions. These
three elements can be conceptualized as different, but they should
be considered intimately integrated in order to understand the
reality of youngsters. Emotional management is unquestionably
a necessary condition for an adequate development of personal
identity (McLean, 2005), socialization (Eisenberg, 2000), and
executive functions (Hofmann et al., 2012). However, it can
be interpreted differently depending on the account of brain
functioning that one assumes. Thus, in this section we will
summarize the impact of understanding the brain as a set of
modules or as a dynamic system on emotional management.
As mentioned above, the CCA of emotional management is
predominant in most empirical or theoretical studies; for that
reason, the explanation from DSP will be more speculative.
Adolescent Emotional Management and
the Componential Computational
Account
The mainstream view of the neuropsychological development of
adolescents leans on emotional self-regulation and the control
of risky behaviors, either intrinsic or extrinsic (Vohs and
Baumeister, 2011; Smith et al., 2013; Bjork and Pardini, 2014;
Goesling et al., 2014; Gross, 2014; Noël, 2014; Willoughby
et al., 2014). This view is supported by the discovery of
an earlier maturation of the basal ganglia with respect to
prefrontal aspects of the cortex, and an overall development
of bottom-up networks prior to the consolidation of top-down
connections (Rubia et al., 2006; Rubia, 2013). At a behavioral
level, sensation-seeking through adolescence follows an inverted-
U shape, whereas impulsivity and self-control follow a linear
decrease and increase, respectively (Steinberg, 2010). Thus, the
general view of adolescence in neuropsychology is some sort of
brute force that is out of control; and different policies to promote
its extrinsic or intrinsic regulation, or even to avoid any kind of
regulation, are proposed (Steinberg, 2008).
In our opinion, this widely accepted view of emotional
management is based on CCA: there are different mind (or
brain) modules and, in a “normal” (adult) condition, some
(cognitive modules) regulate others (emotional modules). Hence,
the key word in emotional management under the scope of
CCA is regulation. In turn, a recent article summarizes the
neural bases of emotional regulation, and its inspiration is clearly
componential computational (Etkin et al., 2015). According
to these authors, emotions are determinants of behavior and
thought, and they have to be regulated; otherwise they can be
excessive or insufficient. They define emotions, following Mauss
et al. (2005), as “sets of cognitive, subjective, physiological, and
motor changes that arise from an individual’s conscious or
non-conscious determination that a stimulus has a positive or
negative value in a particular context and with respect to that
individual’s currently active goals.” The reason why they can
be excessive or insufficient is that their components (cognitive,
physiological, motor, etc.) may be discordant in terms of timing,
magnitude, and duration. In general, emotion regulation is
based on the differential functional attributed to “cognitive” and
“emotional” brain regions, and the regulation of the latter by
the former. Indeed, subcortical nuclei such as the amygdala
and nucleus accumbens develop early in adolescence, due to
hormonal activity, thus changing the world of expectations and
motivations of youngsters (Spear, 2000; Mills et al., 2014). In
addition to this, subcortical-cortical connections from these
nuclei to the prefrontal cortex mature earlier than regulatory
prefrontal cortico-subcortical projections (Somerville and Casey,
2010), initiating a period of special vulnerability in adolescence
(Casey et al., 2011) that may end quite late in adulthood (at
about 25–30 years of age; Steinberg, 2008). In a similar way, other
authors suggest a triadic model where the nucleus accumbens,
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amygdala, and prefrontal cortex would be related to reward-
seeking, harm-avoidance, and supervision, respectively (Ernst
et al., 2006; Ernst and Fudge, 2009). The triadic account can also
be understood as an interplay between social (linked to temporal
cortical areas), personal-emotional (linked to subcortical nuclei),
and cognitive (linked to prefrontal cortex) aspects of adolescence
(Nelson et al., 2005). According to Etkin et al. (2015), emotions
may be regulated through two different mechanisms, namely
explicit and implicit. The former is linked to consciousness, and
the brain areas involved in the process are cortical (ventrolateral
and dorsolateral prefrontal, parietal and supplementary motor
cortex); the latter involves an unconscious self-regulation of the
brain, carried out by the accumbens and ventromedial prefrontal
cortex.
Interestingly, the main authors that suggested neuro-
developmental models of adolescence in the last few decades have
recently published updated versions of their proposals. One of
the most popular is the dual systems model offered by Steinberg,
which is based on the differential developmental pace of the
striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, with respect to that
of the lateral prefrontal, parietal, and cingulate cortices (Shulman
et al., 2016). Although the authors admit that the model is an
oversimplification, they defend its validity for explaining some
attitudes of adolescents, such as risk-taking behavior. Further,
some triadic models also include a third system, governed by the
amygdala, which would be responsible for emotional intensity
and avoidance (Ernst, 2014). Another version of the triadic
model has been proposed by Nelson et al. (2016). According
to them, the driving force of the adolescent’s development is
social behavior, which modulates subcortical structures (thus
having an impact on affect-driven motivation) that interact with
various cortical regions (modulating sensory and perceptual
social representations and executive functions; Nelson et al.,
2016). Overall, in our opinion, all these proposals are based
on an interpretation of the brain that identifies structure and
function, no matter how many physical and/or mental modules
are included in the model. Other prestigious authors on the
topic propose a change in the interpretation of adolescent
development, moving to a more integrated account that they term
the “imbalance” model (Casey et al., 2015). This looks beyond the
modular additive model, and considers behavioral development
under the scope of distributed interactive networks, since the
brain correlates of adolescent behavior are not orthogonal,
but interactive and integrative. They also state the following:
“Perhaps the most prominent difference between dual systems
and imbalance models is how one would approach the study
of brain mechanisms. Rather than focusing on regions (Mills
et al., 2014) or nodes (e.g., ventral striatum, prefrontal cortex)
this approach would examine developmental shifts in the flow
of information and output within and across circuits” (Casey
et al., 2015). In our opinion, the systemic (DSP) interpretation
of adolescent maturation goes beyond this claim, since “flow of
information” and “outputs of circuits” are computational terms
that have no place in complex dynamic systems. From this
perspective, “outputs” and “information” are only understood at a
global level, and not at a “circuit” sublevel. Other authors propose
a wider perspective in order to develop new scientific paradigms.
Thus, Pfeifer and Allen introduced PECANS, a ‘checklist’ to
successfully conduct research on adolescence (Pfeifer and Allen,
2016). The ‘n’ in the acronym refers to ‘Neural inferences,’
and they recognize that the association between regions and
psychological states are many-to-many. They propose, similarly
to Steinberg, a simplification of reality, and concentrate on single
regions as ‘markers’ of psychological processes. Considering this
self-imposed limitation, this approach could be similar to the
dispositional tendency proposed by Anderson.
Apart from this neuropsychological evidence, this modular
vision of emotional management is also supported by the
well-known psychologist Goleman (1995), in particular the
term “amygdala hijacking,” which he proposed. He claims that
amygdala takes control when the neocortex has not yet taken
a decision. Thanks to the regulatory activity, prefrontal areas
act as a modulator of those responses from the amygdala and
other limbic areas. Thus, Goleman concludes that the prefrontal
cortex is the headquarters for emotional self-control, emotional
understanding, and an adequate emotional response. Hence,
following the main line of our review, this author follows a clearly
modular and analytic interpretation of the mind and brain, which
eventually evolves into regulatory. In turn, he defines emotional
intelligence as the ability to control impulses and wait for delayed
rewards, regulate emotional states, and keep calm when required
to think (Goleman, 1995).
In conclusion, the paradigmatic CCA of adolescent
development defines a set of modules that are categorized
into a dual system, composed of a cognitive-control system
and a socioemotional system (Shulman et al., 2016). Both are
confronted and ideally the former regulates the latter. Even
though these two systems may eventually interact, it is important
to note that their functions, natures (as cognitive or emotional),
and brain correlates are defined from the beginning of the
process. This is the main difference from DSP, where all three
factors are dynamic, context-dependent, and rely on the whole
system.
Adolescent Emotional Management and
the Systemic Perspective
As explained above, the three main characteristics of the DSP
are context dependency, functional temporal coupling of brain
areas, and neural reuse. This stands in stark contrast to CCA,
which advocates stable structure-function associations. One of
the most popular systemic conceptualizations of emotions is
offered by Luiz Pessoa. According to Pessoa, emotions, feelings,
and cognition are conceptual distinctions, but not different
events: there is only one integrated event. Classically, emotions
are understood as the body state resulting from a salient stimulus,
whereas feelings would be the conscious interpretation of those
states (Kandel et al., 2000). According to Pessoa, however,
emotion is an ambiguous term that comprises all the elements
necessary to build an idea of the environment and ourselves,
highlighting our personal situation and influencing behavior
(Pessoa, 2010b, 2013). At a psychological level, it is more
convenient to understand emotions and feelings as simultaneous
phenomena that bidirectionally affect each other, both of which
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have conscious and unconscious consequences (Pessoa, 2010a).
A clear-cut distinction between emotions/feelings and cognition
is also problematic. They are clearly integrated in typically
human behaviors such as attention (Ernst et al., 2011), stress
management (LaBar and Cabeza, 2006; McKlveen et al., 2013;
Shansky and Lipps, 2013), memory (Holland and Kensinger,
2010), and decision making (Bechara et al., 1999; Bechara, 2004;
Fair et al., 2007), for example. Moreover, ‘emotional’ brain
regions can be hardly distinguished from ‘cognitive’ ones, since
they are reciprocally connected, and therefore they require each
other. A malfunction in one means a failure of both (LeDoux,
2000; Pessoa, 2008; Manfrinatia et al., 2013; McKlveen et al.,
2013; Barbey et al., 2014). The distinction between emotions
and feelings is conceptually possible, but their boundaries blur
at a neural level: both involve highly complex levels of human
perception (LeDoux, 2000), and both require the synchronous
cooperation of many groups of brain areas (Kober et al., 2009).
In conclusion, nearly every human action involves the activity of
associative and limbic aspects of the brain, whose neural signal is
integrated by reciprocal connections at the very beginning of the
process. Emotion regulation−following CCA−entails a distance
between cognition and emotion in order to develop cognitive
control; however, if there is no gap between them−as suggested
by DSP−, it might be better to talk about a “general growth”
based on the relationship between cognition and emotion,
understood as a conceptual rather than a neuropsychological
distinction, from the very beginning. As mentioned above,
the main explanatory neurobiological tool of DSP is neural
reuse, which entails that focal brain areas can be recruited for
diverse tasks, depending on context. Recently, Anderson has
reviewed the significance of neural reuse in the organization and
development of the brain (Anderson, 2016). According to him,
neural reuse is particularly important in neurodevelopment as
follows: (i) local regions of the brain are involved in diverse
tasks across multiple domains (perception, action, etc); (ii) taking
into account interactive differentiation, the set of tasks that each
region supports is different from region to region; (iii) early
developing regions are reused in more tasks, because they have
been available for a longer time; and (iv) the later in development
a cognitive function emerges, the more scattered regions are
recruited for carrying it out, due to the availability of more useful
functional elements. These facts show that brain regions such
as the ventral striatum, which mature early in adolescence, are
available for tasks beyond emotion-related process. In addition,
cognitive functions with a delayed maturation in adolescence, like
cognitive control, recruit scattered regions such as an inferior
fronto-striatal-thalamic-cerebellar network (Rubia et al., 2007).
In the following paragraphs, we will summarize the various tasks
in which the main components of the limbic systems are involved.
The circuit of Papez (1973), the first neuroanatomical
description of the limbic circuit, has been extensively enriched in
recent decades (see, for example, the recent revision by Catani
et al., 2013). Relevant research shows that the limbic system,
in a wide sense, involves many different brain regions, whose
activity is integrated through the synchronization of multiple
frequency bands (Pessoa, 2008, 2013). Furthermore, a recent
meta-analysis of cortical-subcortical interactions in emotional
processing concludes that limbic regions (e.g., amygdala) are
strongly connected to cognitive areas, such as the prefrontal
cortex (Kober et al., 2009). In the following lines we will
summarize the role of the main components of the limbic system
(amygdala, nucleus accumbens, and cortical regions), stressing
their interaction with cognitive-related areas. From DSP, the
integration of the neural information coded by each area does
not happen at the end of the process, because there is no process
without integration at the very beginning.
The main role of the amygdala consists in valuing the
environment with respect to the biological needs of the
subject. This includes emotional-affective valuations (Pessoa and
Adolphs, 2011). However, the brain can also assign values without
recruiting the amygdala (LeDoux, 2013), and this brain area also
participates in processes unrelated to emotions (Pessoa, 2013).
In general, the signal processed in this complex is modulated
by afferents from associative regions of the cortex. In fact,
the prefrontal corticoamygdaloid projections are distinctive of
humans (Pessoa, 2010b; Pessoa and Adolphs, 2011; Schumann
et al., 2011).
The nucleus accumbens is mainly in charge of organizing
approach or avoidance behaviors with respect to a stimulus or
context (Ernst et al., 2006; Hoebel et al., 2007; Carlezon and
Thomas, 2009; Brooks and Berns, 2014). Thus, it is involved
in motivation for goal-directed actions (Meredith et al., 2008;
Wolf and Ferrario, 2010). However, the accumbens is also
involved in value-independent associations (Cerri et al., 2014).
At a neuroanatomical level, although this ventral aspect of the
striatum is included in the limbic system, the information it
processes is integrated by reciprocal projections between the
nuclei of the basal ganglia, and also by striatal interneurons
(Haber, 2003; Bernacer et al., 2005, 2012; Prensa et al., 2009).
The conveyance of the neural information to the thalamus and
cortex only happens when it is integrated. In fact, the reciprocal
influence between the nucleus accumbens and the dopaminergic
ventral tegmental area−located in the midbrain−is modulated
by glutamatergic projections reaching the accumbens from the
cortex and other subcortical nuclei (Picciotto, 2013).
At a cortical level, the orbitofrontal cortex allows the valuation
of a stimulus considering the expectations of the subject and
the information processed by the amygdala, accumbens, and
different cortical regions (Schoenbaum and Roesch, 2005; Ernst
et al., 2006; Padoa-Schioppa and Cai, 2011; McDannald et al.,
2012). Its efferent connections are mainly sent to the brainstem
(McDannald et al., 2012), amygdala, and nucleus accumbens
(Blakemore and Choudhury, 2006), facilitating behavioral
flexibility (Cardinal et al., 2002). One of the cortical areas initially
related with the limbic system was the cingulate cortex, although
it is now known to be mainly related to cognitive aspects such as
error monitoring and decision making under uncertainty (Carter,
1998; Goñi et al., 2011; Strang et al., 2011). In order to carry
out these processes successfully, it is connected with associative
(prefrontal cortex) and limbic (amygdala) structures. Besides this,
the anterior cingulate, together with part of the insular cortex,
has been reported to contain spindle−von Economo−neurons,
which are related to self-awareness (Allman et al., 2012). The
insula is another key area for understanding the integration
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of different modalities of information: the posterior aspects
integrate perceptual information, which is in turn combined
in the central part with the afferents received from temporal,
prefrontal, cingulate, and orbitofrontal cortical areas, as well
as from the amygdala and hypothalamus. The third level of
integration happens in the most anterior part, usually associated
with self-awareness (Craig, 2009; Medford and Critchley, 2010;
Sporns, 2011).
Although other limbic-related areas could be mentioned, we
believe that the main idea of this section is already justified:
even if we accept that there are emotional and cognitive areas
in the brain, they are intimately related to each other. In fact,
the interaction is even closer at a behavioral level. From a
systemic perspective, emotions and cognition are conceptual
categorizations, but they are not processed independently in the
brain. Therefore, suggesting a cognitive regulation of emotions
is not realistic, because they are intrinsically integrated in their
own development. Rather, from DSP, emotions are integrated
into human behavior. In any case, experimental research on
adolescent neurodevelopment from DSP still needs to be boosted.
The main empirical tool for demonstrating neural reuse is the
functional fingerprinting proposed mainly by Anderson et al.
(2013). This is a sort of meta-analytical method that creates
a multidimensional vector for each brain region of interest.
Each of the dimensions of the vector corresponds to different
domains where a task can be categorized, for example: motor
learning, motor observation, emotions-happiness, emotions-
disgust, and so on. These diversity profiles are intended to
reveal all the different task domains in which a particular
brain area is involved. In other words, the neurons in that
area are reused for as many task types as the plot shows.
To the best of our knowledge, no research has applied this
method to adolescents. Furthermore, it would be extremely
interesting to conduct this kind of study in longitudinal analyses,
although the methodological limitations are obvious. Apart
from the research field of neurodevelopment, several authors
within psychology have stressed the importance of developing
models that shift the focus away from the late maturation of
cognition after adolescence. For example, Reyna and Farley
(2006) state that “contrary to popular wisdom, adolescents
see themselves as more vulnerable than adults do, and they
typically overestimate important risks.” Moreover, they argue
that even though reasoning evolves during and after adolescence,
some biases emerge that produce violations of coherence
more frequently in adults than in youngsters. In a similar
way, using a gambling task, empirical research reveals that
adolescents are rational decision makers, since they tend to reject
disadvantageous gambles and to accept more favorable options
more often than adults (Barkley-Levenson and Galvan, 2014).
Finally, it has recently been suggested that peaks in ventral
striatum sensibility, which has classically been interpreted as a
neural correlate of risk- or sensation-seeking, can be an adaptive
neural mechanism to promote healthy behavior in adolescents,
such as academic motivation, engagement in hobbies, healthy
peer relations, and prosocial behaviors (Telzer, 2016). According
to the author, the interpretation of this neurodevelopmental
fact may be understood as a source of vulnerability or of
opportunity, depending on context (maternal presence, peer
influence, etc.).
CONCLUSION. TWO ACCOUNTS OF
ADOLESCENT EMOTIONAL
MANAGEMENT: REGULATION AND
INTEGRATION
In this manuscript we have reviewed the neuropsychological
development of adolescents in two different interpretations of
brain functioning, namely componential computational and
dynamic systemic. We have shown that the interpretation of the
adolescent’s reality is different depending on the model, especially
in terms of emotional management. Remarkably, we have argued
that the key words that best define emotional management in
these models are regulation and integration, respectively. Based
on the scientific literature CCA is the predominant view, wherein
the emotional-related aspects of the adolescent’s brain escape
the regulation of the cognitive regions. Previous research on
adolescents’ development from DSP is scarce, so we have based
our review on novel models of emotion and neural reuse in
this interpretation. According to these models, a particular brain
area cannot be associated with a single function, and ‘cognitive’
regions cannot regulate ‘emotional’ areas because their function
is integrated from the beginning of the process: although the
terms should be conceptually distinguished, there is no emotion
without cognition, and vice versa.
The final goal of our review was to show that the
global interpretation of adolescent maturation depends on the
underlying account of brain functioning. Ultimately, this will
affect educational and legal policies to promote the best personal
development of adolescents. Before being implemented, the
question of whether regulation or integration is the best approach
to promoting emotional self-management in adolescents should
be considered. In this respect, CCA of the mind and brain
and the subsequent interpretation of emotional management as
regulation assume that: (i) regulatory and regulated modules are
clearly identified, and thus a distance exists between them; (ii)
there is a starting point (emotional situation A) and an end
point (emotional situation B); (iii) the relationship between the
cognitive and the emotional modules is unbalanced, such that the
latter automatically impacts on the former in early adolescence,
and the former’s goal throughout the process is to end up
controlling the latter. With respect to the educational and legal
consequences deriving from this account, a detailed description
is far beyond the scope of this article. The simplified idea
would be that adolescents are in a vulnerable condition due to
their imbalanced development. Therefore, legal and educational
systems need to build a context within which adolescents are less
prone to harming themselves or others. Concerning emotions
they are understood as drivers of behavior, and youngsters should
focus on being guided by positive emotions within the constraints
set by the context.
On the other hand, if brain architecture is viewed under the
scope of DSP, emotional management is interpreted as involving
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the whole system. In this case, emotions are integrated in the
whole development of the subject. In our opinion, emotional
management from DSP is framed as the growth of the whole
person. The assumptions in this case are: (i) there are no
brain modules, and mental processes−involving cognition and
emotion−correlate with the activity of the brain as a whole; (ii)
personal development does not involve a fixed end point, that
is, a final emotional state that should be reached: integration
of cognition and emotion delimitates a pathway of unrestricted
growth, where the important issue for the subject is the process
itself, rather than the final point; (iii) in the development of a
system, all elements interact with each other from the beginning
of the process; therefore, there is no independent transformation
of elements.
What are the possible implications of DSP in terms of legal
or educational policies? The systemic view and its associated
understanding of emotional management, as we have proposed
here, emphasize one critical point of adolescence: responsibility.
Youngers are not viewed as vulnerable, but as living a unique
opportunity to develop their own personal identity. Therefore,
the educational system has to help them to seize the opportunity
by going beyond the resolution of concrete immediate problems,
and aiding the adolescent to contextualize each decision in a
continuous growth landscape. From this perspective, emotions
give information about how development is taking place: they are
something to reflect on, but not drivers of behavior.
The prestigious philosopher of education Richard Stanley
Peters states that the final aim of education is to turn
adolescents into better men and women, and this is not
achieved through mere training in certain cognitive or emotional
abilities. The final goal of adolescent education points toward
a global interpretation of one’s own life and of the rest of
the world, which goes beyond particular skills (Peters, 1966,
1967). Although we have presented the two interpretations
of brain architecture and their resulting views of emotional
management objectively, we believe that emotional management
as integration is more suitable and realistic in accounting
for the adolescent’s reality. Following Peters’ argumentation,
emotional regulation would then be understood as a particular
ability of the person, whereas emotional integration affects the
whole person. In our opinion, recent neuroscientific findings
demonstrate that DSP is a better model to explain brain
anatomy and functioning, since CCA requires more conceptual
assumptions. Likewise, integration may be a more adequate
framework for emotional management than regulation, since
it does not require conceptualizing the fragmented reality of
adolescents.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
JVOS originally conceived the hypothesis of this work. JVOS,
JIM, and JB developed the hypothesis and contributed to the
preparation of the manuscript.
FUNDING
This work has been supported by Fundación Caja Navarra, and by
the Institute for Culture and Society (ICS), University of Navarra.
REFERENCES
Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Damasio, H., and Damasio, A. (1994). Impaired
recognition of emotion in facial expressions following bilateral damage
to the human amygdala. Nature 372, 669–672. doi: 10.1038/372
669a0
Allman, J. M., Tetreault, N. A., Hakeem, A. Y., Manaye, K. F., Erwin, J. M.,
Park, S., et al. (2012). The von economo neurons in fronto-insular and anterior
cingulate cortex. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 1225, 59–71. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.
2011.06011.x.The
Anderson, M. (2015). After Phrenology: Neural Reuse and the Interacting Brain.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Anderson, M. L. (2010). Neural reuse: a fundamental organizational principle of
the brain. Behav. Brain Sci. 33, 245–266; discussion 266–313. doi: 10.1017/
S0140525X10000853
Anderson, M. L. (2016). Neural reuse in the organization and development
of the brain. Dev. Med. Child Neurol. 58, 3–6. doi: 10.1111/dmcn.
13039
Anderson, M. L., Kinnison, J., and Pessoa, L. (2013). Describing functional
diversity of brain regions and brain networks. Neuroimage 73, 50–58. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.01.071
Anokhin, A. P., Golosheykin, S., and Mulligan, R. C. (2015). Long-term test-retest
reliability of delayed reward discounting in adolescents. Behav. Processes 111,
55–59. doi: 10.1016/j.beproc.2014.11.008
Barbey, A. K., Colom, R., and Grafman, J. (2014). Distributed neural system for
emotional intelligence revealed by lesion mapping. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci.
9, 265–272. doi: 10.1093/scan/nss124
Barkley-Levenson, E., and Galvan, A. (2014). Neural representation of expected
value in the adolescent brain. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 111, 1646–1651. doi:
10.1073/pnas.1319762111
Baumgartner, T., Schiller, B., Hill, C., and Knoch, D. (2013). Impartiality in humans
is predicted by brain structure of dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. Neuroimage 81,
317–324. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.05.047
Bechara, A. (2004). The role of emotion in decision-making: evidence from
neurological patients with orbitofrontal damage. Brain Cogn. 55, 30–40. doi:
10.1016/j.bandc.2003.04.001
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Damasio, A. R., and Lee, G. P. (1999). Different
contributions of the human amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex to
decision-making. J. Neurosci. 19, 5473–5481.
Benes, F., Turtle, M., Khan, Y., and Farol, P. (1994). Myelination of a key
relay zone in the hippocampal formation occurs in the human brain during
childhood, adolescence, and adulthood. Arch. Gen. Psychiatry 51, 477–484. doi:
10.1001/archpsyc.1994.03950060041004
Benes, F. M. (1989). Myelination of cortical-hippocampal relays during late
adolescence. Schizophr. Bull. 15, 585–593. doi: 10.1093/schbul/15.4.585
Bernacer, J., and Murillo, J. I. (2014). The Aristotelian conception of habit and
its contribution to human neuroscience. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:883. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2014.00883
Bernacer, J., Prensa, L., and Giménez-Amaya, J. M. (2005). Morphological
features, distribution and compartmental organization of the nicotinamide
adenine dinucleotide phosphate reduced-diaphorase interneurons in the
human striatum. J. Comp. Neurol. 489, 311–327. doi: 10.1002/cne.20616
Bernacer, J., Prensa, L., and Giménez-Amaya, J. M. (2012). Distribution of
GABAergic interneurons and dopaminergic cells in the functional territories of
the human striatum. PLoS ONE 7:e30504. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0030504
Bjork, J. M., and Pardini, D. A. (2014). Who are those “risk-taking adolescents”?
Individual differences in developmental neuroimaging research. Dev. Cogn.
Neurosci. 11, 56–64. doi: 10.1016/j.dcn.2014.07.008
Blakemore, S.-J. (2008). The social brain in adolescence. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 9,
267–277. doi: 10.1038/nrn2353
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 August 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1263
fpsyg-07-01263 August 20, 2016 Time: 14:30 # 10
Oron Semper et al. Different Views of Adolescent Emotional Management
Blakemore, S.-J., Burnett, S., and Dahl, R. E. (2010). The role of puberty in the
developing adolescent brain. Hum. Brain Mapp. 31, 926–933. doi: 10.1002/
hbm.21052
Blakemore, S.-J., and Choudhury, S. (2006). Development of the adolescent brain:
implications for executive function and social cognition. J. Child Psychol.
Psychiatry 47, 296–312. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-7610.2006.01611.x
Brooks, A. M., and Berns, G. S. (2014). Aversive stimuli and loss in the
mesocorticolimbic dopamine system. Trends Cogn. Sci. 17, 281–286. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2013.04.001
Bullmore, E., and Sporns, O. (2009). Complex brain networks: graph theoretical
analysis of structural and functional systems. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 10, 186–198.
doi: 10.1038/nrn2575
Callaghan, B. L., Graham, B. M., Li, S., and Richardson, R. (2013). From resilience
to vulnerability: mechanistic insights into the effects of stress on transitions
in critical period plasticity. Front. Psychiatry 4:90. doi: 10.3389/fpsyt.2013.
00090
Cardinal, R. N., Parkinson, J. A., Halla, J., and Everitt, B. J. (2002). Emotion and
motivation: the role of the amygdala, ventral striatum, and prefrontal cortex.
Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 26, 321–352. doi: 10.1016/S0149-7634(02)00007-6
Carlezon, W. A., and Thomas, M. J. (2009). Biological substrates of reward and
aversion: a nucleus accumbens activity hypothesis. Neuropharmacology 56,
122–132. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropharm.2008.06.075
Carter, C. S. (1998). Anterior cingulate cortex, error detection, and the online
monitoring of performance. Science 280, 747–749. doi: 10.1126/science.
280.5364.747
Casey, B., Jones, R. M., and Somerville, L. H. (2011). Braking and accelerating
of the adolescent brain. J. Res. Adolesc. 21, 21–33. doi: 10.1111/j.1532-7795.
2010.00712.x
Casey, B. J., Galván, A., and Somerville, L. H. (2015). Beyond simple models of
adolescence to an integrated circuit-based account: a commentary. Dev. Cogn.
Neurosci. 17, 128–130. doi: 10.1016/j.dcn.2015.12.006
Catani, M., Dell’acqua, F., and Thiebaut de Schotten, M. (2013). A revised limbic
system model for memory, emotion and behaviour. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 37,
1724–1737. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2013.07.001
Cerri, D., Saddoris, M., and Carelli, R. (2014). Nucleus accumbens core neurons
encode value-independent associations necessary for sensory preconditioning.
Behav. Neurosci. 128, 567–578. doi: 10.1037/a0037797
Choudhury, S., McKinney, K. A., and Merten, M. (2012). Rebelling against the
brain: public engagement with the “neurological adolescent. Soc. Sci. Med. 74,
565–573. doi: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2011.10.029
Craig, A. D. B. (2009). Emotional moments across time: a possible neural basis for
time perception in the anterior insula. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci
364, 1933–1942. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2009.0008
Crone, E. A., and Dahl, R. E. (2012). Understanding adolescence as a period of
social-affective engagement and goal flexibility. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 13, 636–650.
doi: 10.1038/nrn3313
Cunningham, M. G., Bhattacharyya, S., and Benes, F. M. (2002). Amygdalo-cortical
sprouting continues into early adulthood: implications for the development
of normal and abnormal function during adolescence. J. Comp. Neurol. 453,
116–130. doi: 10.1002/cne.10376
de Reus, M. A., and van den Heuvel, M. P. (2014). Simulated rich club lesioning
in brain networks: a scaffold for communication and integration? Front. Hum.
Neurosci 8:647. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00647
Dennis, E. L., and Thompson, P. M. (2013). Mapping connectivity
in the developing brain. Int. J. Dev. Neurosci. 31, 525–542. doi:
10.1016/j.ijdevneu.2013.05.007
Eisenberg, N. (2000). Emotion, regulation and moral development. Annu. Rev.
Psychol. 51, 665–697. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.51.1.665
Erikson, E. H. (1998). The Life Cycle Completed. New York, NY: W. W. Norton &
Company.
Ernst, M. (2014). The triadic model perspective for the study of adolescent
motivated behavior. Brain Cogn. 89, 104–111. doi: 10.1016/j.bandc.2014.01.006
Ernst, M., Daniele, T., and Frantz, K. (2011). New perspectives on adolescent
motivated behavior: attention and conditioning. Dev. Cogn. Neurosci. 1, 377–
389. doi: 10.1016/j.dcn.2011.07.013
Ernst, M., and Fudge, J. (2009). A developmental neurobiological model of
motivated behavior: anatomy, connectivity and ontogeny of the triadic nodes.
Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 33, 367–382. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2008.10.009
Ernst, M., Pine, D. S., and Hardin, M. (2006). Triadic model of the neurobiology
of motivated behavior in adolescence. Psychol. Med. 36, 299–312. doi:
10.1017/S0033291705005891
Ertl, M., Hildebrandta, M., Ourinaa, K., Leichta, G., and Mulert, C. (2013). Emotion
regulation by cognitive reappraisal — The role of frontal theta oscillations.
Neuroimage 81, 412–421. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.05.044
Etkin, A., Büchel, C., and Gross, J. J. (2015). The neural bases of emotion regulation.
Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 16, 693–700. doi: 10.1038/nrn4044
Fair, D. A., Cohen, A. L., Power, J. D., Dosenbach, N. U. F., Church, J. A.,
Miezin, F. M., et al. (2009). Functional brain networks develop from a
“local to distributed” organization. PLoS Comput. Biol. 5:e1000381. doi:
10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000381
Fair, D. A., Dosenbach, N. U. F., Church, J. A., Cohen, A. L., Brahmbhatt, S.,
Miezin, F. M., et al. (2007). Development of distinct control networks through
segregation and integration. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 104, 13507–13512. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0705843104
Feinstein, J. S., Buzza, C., Hurlemann, R., Follmer, R. L., Dahdaleh, N. S., Coryell,
W. H., et al. (2013). Fear and panic in humans with bilateral amygdala damage.
Nat. Neurosci. 16, 270–272. doi: 10.1038/nn.3323
Fodor, J. (1983). The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT press.
Fodor, J. (2000). The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of
Computational Psychology. Cambridge, MA: The MIT press.
Fuster, J. M. (2001). The prefrontal cortex – An update: time is of the essence.
Neuron 30, 319–333. doi: 10.1016/S0896-6273(01)00285-9
Giedd, J. N. (2012). The digital revolution and adolescent brain evolution.
J. Adolesc. Health 51, 101–105. doi: 10.1016/j.jadohealth.2012.06.002
Goesling, B., Colman, S., Trenholm, C., Terzian, M., and Moore, K. (2014).
Programs to reduce teen pregnancy, sexually transmitted infections, and
associated sexual risk behaviors: a systematic review. J. Adolesc. Heal. 54,
499–507. doi: 10.1016/j.jadohealth.2013.12.004
Goleman, D. (1995). Emotional Intelligence. New York, NY: Delta Books.
Goñi, J., Aznárez-Sanado, M., Arrondo, G., Fernández-Seara, M., Loayza, F. R.,
Heukamp, F. H., et al. (2011). The neural substrate and functional integration
of uncertainty in decision making: an information theory approach. PLoS ONE
6:e17408. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0017408
Gross, J. J. (2014). “Emotion regulation: conceptual and empirical foundations,” in
Handbook of Emotion Regulation, ed. J. J. Gross (New York, NY: The Guilford
Press).
Haber, S. (2003). The primate basal ganglia: parallel and integrative networks.
J. Chem. Neuroanat. 26, 317–330. doi: 10.1016/j.jchemneu.2003.10.003
Hartline, D. K., and Colman, D. R. (2007). Rapid conduction and the
evolution of giant axons and myelinated fibers. Curr. Biol. 17, R29–R35. doi:
10.1016/j.cub.2006.11.042
Hensch, T. K., and Bilimoria, P. M. (2012). Re-opening windows: manipulating
critical periods for brain development. Cerebrum 2012, 11.
Hoebel, B. G., Avena, N. M., and Rada, P. (2007). Accumbens dopamine-
acetylcholine balance in approach and avoidance. Curr. Opin. Pharmacol. 7,
617–627. doi: 10.1016/j.coph.2007.10.014
Hofmann, W., Schmeichel, B. J., and Baddeley, A. D. (2012). Executive
functions and self-regulation. Trends Cogn. Sci. 16, 174–180. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2012.01.006
Holland, A. C., and Kensinger, E. A. (2010). Emotion and autobiographical
memory. Phys. Life Rev. 7, 88–131. doi: 10.1016/j.plrev.2010.01.006
Huttenlocher, P. R., and Dabholkar, A. S. (1997). Regional differences in
synaptogenesis in human cerebral cortex. J. Comp. Neurol. 387, 167–178. doi:
10.1002/(SICI)1096-9861(19971020)387:2<167::AID-CNE1>3.0.CO;2-Z
Johnson, M. H. (2011). Interactive Specialization: a domain-general framework
for human functional brain development? Dev. Cogn. Neurosci. 1, 7–21. doi:
10.1016/j.dcn.2010.07.003
Kandel, E., Schwart, J., and Jessell, T. (2000). Principles of Neural Science. New York,
NY: McGraw-Hill.
Kanemura, H., Aihara, M., Aoki, S., Araki, T., and Nakazawa, S. (2014).
Development of the prefrontal lobe in infants and children: a three-
dimensional magnetic resonance volumetric study. Brain Dev. 25, 195–199. doi:
10.1016/S0387-7604(02)00214-0
Kelso, J. (1995). Dynamic Patterns. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kober, H., Barrett, L. F., Joseph, J., Bliss-Moreau, E., Lindquist, K. A., and Wager,
T. D. (2009). Functional grouping and cortical–subcortical interactions in
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 August 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1263
fpsyg-07-01263 August 20, 2016 Time: 14:30 # 11
Oron Semper et al. Different Views of Adolescent Emotional Management
emotion: a meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies. Neuroimage 42, 998–1031.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2008.03.059
Kohlberg, L. (1973). The claim to moral adequacy of a highest stage of moral
judgment. J. Philos. 70, 630–646. doi: 10.2307/2025030
Konrad, K., Firk, C., and Uhlhaas, P. J. (2013). Brain development during
adolescence: neuroscientific insights into this developmental period. Dtsch.
Arztebl. Int. 110, 425–431. doi: 10.3238/arztebl.2013.0425
Kroger, J., Martinussen, M., and Marcia, J. E. (2010). Identity status change during
adolescence and young adulthood: a meta-analysis. J. Adolesc. 33, 683–698. doi:
10.1016/j.adolescence.2009.11.002
LaBar, K. S., and Cabeza, R. (2006). Cognitive neuroscience of emotional memory.
Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 7, 54–64. doi: 10.1038/nrn1825
LeDoux, J. E. (2000). Emotion circuits in the brain. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 23,
155–184. doi: 10.1146/annurev.neuro.23.1.155
LeDoux, J. E. (2013). The slippery slope of fear. Trends Cogn. Sci. 17, 155–156. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2013.02.004
Luyckx, K., Klimstra, T. A., Duriez, B., van Petegem, S., and Beyers, W. (2013).
Personal identity processes from adolescence through the Late 20s: age
trends, functionality, and depressive symptoms. Soc. Dev. 22, 701–721. doi:
10.1111/sode.12027
Manfrinatia, A., Lottoa, L., Sarlob, M., Palombab, D., Rino, R., Manfrinati, A., et al.
(2013). Moral dilemmas and moral principles: when emotion and cognition
unite. Cogn. Emot. 27, 1276–1291. doi: 10.1080/02699931.2013.785388
Manning, J., Hedden, T., Wickens, N., Whitfield-Gabrieli, S., Prelec, D.,
and Gabrieli, J. D. E. (2014). Personality influences temporal discounting
preferences: behavioral and brain evidence. Neuroimage 98, 42–49. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.04.066
Marcia, J., and Josselson, R. (2013). Eriksonian personality research and its
implications for psychotherapy. J. Pers. 81, 617–629. doi: 10.1111/jopy.12014
Marek, S., Hwang, K., Foran, W., Hallquist, M. N., and Luna, B. (2015). The
contribution of network organization and integration to the development
of cognitive control. PLoS Biol. 13:e1002328. doi: 10.1371/journal.pbio.
1002328
Mauss, I. B., Levenson, R. W., McCarter, L., Wilhelm, F. H., and Gross, J. J.
(2005). The tie that binds? coherence among emotion experience, behavior, and
physiology. Emotion 5, 175–190. doi: 10.1037/1528-3542.5.2.175
McDannald, M. A., Takahashi, Y. K., Lopatina, N., Pietras, B. W., Jones, J. L.,
and Schoenbaum, G. (2012). Model-based learning and the contribution of the
orbitofrontal cortex to the model-free world. Eur. J. Neurosci. 35, 991–996. doi:
10.1111/j.1460-9568.2011.07982.x
McKlveen, J. M., Myers, B., Flak, J. N., Bundzikova, J., Solomon, M. B., Seroogy,
K. B., et al. (2013). Role of prefrontal cortex glucocorticoid receptors in stress
and emotion. Biol. Psychiatry 74, 672–679. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2013.03.024
McLean, K. C. (2005). Late adolescent identity development: narrative meaning
making and memory telling. Dev. Psychol. 41, 683–691. doi: 10.1037/0012-
1649.41.4.683
Medford, N., and Critchley, H. D. (2010). Conjoint activity of anterior insular
and anterior cingulate cortex: awareness and response. Brain Struct. Funct. 214,
535–549. doi: 10.1007/s00429-010-0265-x
Meeus, W., Oosterwegel, A., and Vollerbergh, A. (2002). Parental and peer
attachment and identity development in adolescence. J. Adolesc. 25, 93–106. doi:
10.1006/jado.2001.0451
Merabet, L. B., Hamilton, R., Schlaug, G., Swisher, J. D., Kiriakopoulos, E. T.,
Pitskel, N. B., et al. (2008). Rapid and reversible recruitment of early visual
cortex for touch. PLoS ONE 3:e3046. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0003046
Meredith, G. E., Baldo, B. A., Andrezjewski, M. E., and Kelley, A. E. (2008). The
structural basis for mapping behavior onto the striatum and its subdivisions.
Brain Struct. Funct. 213, 17–27. doi: 10.1007/s00429-008-0175-3
Mills, K. L., Goddings, A.-L., Clasen, L. S., Giedd, J. N., and Blakemore, S.-J.
(2014). The developmental mismatch in structural brain maturation during
adolescence. Dev. Neurosci. 36, 147–160. doi: 10.1159/000362328
Nelson, E. E., Jarcho, J. M., and Guyer, A. E. (2016). Social re-orientation and brain
development: an expanded and updated view. Dev. Cogn. Neurosci. 17, 118–127.
doi: 10.1016/j.dcn.2015.12.008
Nelson, E. E., Leibenluft, E., McClure, E. B., and Pine, D. S. (2005). The
social re-orientation of adolescence: a neuroscience perspective on the
process and its relation to psychopathology. Psychol. Med. 35, 163–174. doi:
10.1017/S0033291704003915
Noël, X. (2014). Why adolescents are at risk of misusing alcohol and gambling.
Alcohol Alcohol. 49, 165–172. doi: 10.1093/alcalc/agt161
Ofen, N., and Shing, Y. L. (2013). From perception to memory: changes in
memory systems across the lifespan. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 37, 2258–2267.
doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2013.04.006
Orón, J. V. (2014). Toward a new conception of habit and self-control in adolescent
maturation. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 8:525. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00525
Padoa-Schioppa, C., and Cai, X. (2011). Orbitofrontal cortex and the computation
of subjective value: consolidated concepts and new perspectives. Ann. N. Y.
Acad. Sci. 1239, 130–137. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06262.x
Papez, J. W. (1973). A proposed mechanism of emotion. Arch NeurPsych. 38,
725–743. doi: 10.1001/archneurpsyc.1937.02260220069003
Pessoa, L. (2008). On the relationship between emotion and cognition. Nat. Rev.
Neurosci. 9, 148–158. doi: 10.1038/nrn2317
Pessoa, L. (2010a). Emergent processes in cognitive-emotional interactions.
Dialogues Clin. Neurosci. 12, 433–448.
Pessoa, L. (2010b). Emotion and cognition and the amygdala: from “what
is it?” to “what’s to be done?”. Neuropsychologia 48, 3416–3429. doi:
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.06.038
Pessoa, L. (2013). The cognitive-emotional brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Pessoa, L., and Adolphs, R. (2011). Emotion processing and the amygdala: from
a “low road” to “many roads” of evaluating biological significance. Nat. Rev.
Neurosci. 11, 773–783. doi: 10.1038/nrn2920.Emotion
Peters, R. S. (1966). Ethics and Education. New York, NY: Routledge.
Peters, R. S. (1967). “What is an educational process,” in The Concept of Education,
ed. R. S. Peters (London: Routledge and Kegan Pau), 1–23.
Pfeifer, J. H., and Allen, N. B. (2016). The audacity of specificity: moving
adolescent developmental neuroscience towards more powerful scientific
paradigms and translatable models. Dev. Cogn. Neurosci. 17, 131–137. doi:
10.1016/j.dcn.2015.12.012
Piaget, J. (1974). The future of developmental child psychology. J. Youth Adolesc.
3, 87–93. doi: 10.1007/BF02215168
Picciotto, M. R. (2013). An indirect resilience to addiction. Nat. Neurosci. 16,
521–523. doi: 10.1038/nn.3375
Pinker, S. (1997). How the Mind Works. New York, NY: Norton & Company.
Pitskel, N. B., Bolling, D. Z., Kaiser, M. D., Crowley, M. J., and Pelphrey,
K. A. (2011). How grossed out are you? The neural bases of emotion
regulation from childhood to adolescence. Dev. Cogn. Neurosci. 1, 324–337. doi:
10.1016/j.dcn.2011.03.004
Poldrack, R. A. (2006). Can cognitive processes be inferred from neuroimaging
data? Trends Cogn. Sci. 10, 59–63. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2005.12.004
Poldrack, R. A. (2010). Mapping mental function to brain structure: how
can cognitive neuroimaging succeed? Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 5, 753–761. doi:
10.1177/1745691610388777
Powell, K. (2006). How does the teenage brain work? Nature 442, 865–867. doi:
10.1038/442865a
Prensa, L., Gimenez-Amaya, J. M., Parent, A., Bernacer, J., and Cebrian, C.
(2009). The nigrostriatal pathway: axonal collateralization and compartmental
specificity. J. Neural. Transm. Suppl. 73, 49–58.
Ramos, J. M. (2013). Differential contribution of hippocampus, perirhinal
cortex and postrhinal cortex.pdf. Behav. Brain Res. 247, 59–64. doi:
10.1016/j.bbr2013.03.017
Reyna, V. F., and Farley, F. (2006). Risk and rationality in adolescent decision
making: implications for theory, practice, and public policy. Psychol. Sci. Public
Interes. 7, 1–44. doi: 10.1111/j.1529-1006.2006.00026.x
Rubia, K. (2013). Functional brain imaging across development. Eur. Child Adolesc.
Psychiatry 22, 719–731. doi: 10.1007/s00787-012-0291-8
Rubia, K., Smith, A., Taylor, E., and Brammer, M. (2007). Linear age-
correlated functional development of right inferior fronto-striato-cerebellar
networks during response inhibition and anterior cingulate during error-
related processes. Hum. Brain Mapp. 28, 1163–1177. doi: 10.1002/hbm.
20347
Rubia, K., Smith, A., Woolley, J., Nosarti, C., Heyman, I., Taylor, E., et al.
(2006). Progressive increase of frontostriatal brain activation from childhood
to adulthood during event-related tasks of cognitive control. Hum. Brain Mapp.
27, 973–993. doi: 10.1002/hbm.20237
Schoenbaum, G., and Roesch, M. (2005). Orbitofrontal cortex, associative learning,
and expectancies. Neuron 47, 633–636. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2005.07.018
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 August 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1263
fpsyg-07-01263 August 20, 2016 Time: 14:30 # 12
Oron Semper et al. Different Views of Adolescent Emotional Management
Schott, B. H., Niklas, C., Kaufmann, J., Bodammer, N. C., Machts, J., Schütze, H.,
et al. (2011). Fiber density between rhinal cortex and activated ventrolateral
prefrontal regions predicts episodic memory performance in humans. Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 108, 5408–5413. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1013287108
Schumann, C. M., Bauman, M. D., and Amaral, D. G. (2011). Abnormal
structure or function of the amygdala is a common component of
neurodevelopmental disorders. Neuropsychologia 49, 745–759. doi: 10.1016/
j.neuropsychologia.2010.09.028
Sebastian, C., Burnett, S., and Blakemore, S.-J. (2008). Development of
the self-concept during adolescence. Trends Cogn. Sci. 12, 441–446. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2008.07.008
Shansky, R. M., and Lipps, J. (2013). Stress-induced cognitive dysfunction:
hormone-neurotransmitter interactions in the prefrontal cortex. Front. Hum.
Neurosci. 7:123. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00123
Shulman, E. P., Smith, A. R., Silva, K., Icenogle, G., Duell, N., Chein, J., et al.
(2016). The dual systems model: review, reappraisal, and reaffirmation. Dev.
Cogn. Neurosci. 17, 103–117. doi: 10.1016/j.dcn.2015.12.010
Smith, A. R., Chein, J., and Steinberg, L. (2013). Impact of socio-emotional context,
brain development, and pubertal maturation on adolescent risk-taking. Horm.
Behav. 64, 323–332. doi: 10.1016/j.yhbeh.2013.03.006
Somerville, L. H., and Casey, B. J. (2010). Developmental neurobiology of cognitive
control and motivational systems. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 20, 236–241. doi:
10.1016/j.conb.2010.01.006
Spear, L. P. (2000). The adolescent brain and age-related behavioral manifestations.
Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 24, 417–463. doi: 10.1016/S0149-7634(00)00014-2
Sporns, O. (2011). The human connectome: a complex network. Ann. N. Y. Acad.
Sci. 1224, 109–125. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2010.05888.x
Steinberg, L. (2008). A social neuroscience perspective on adolescent risk-taking.
Dev. Rev. 28, 1–27. doi: 10.1016/j.dr.2007.08.002.A
Steinberg, L. (2010). A dual systems model of adolescent risk-taking. Dev.
Psychobiol. 52, 216–224. doi: 10.1002/dev.20445
Strang, N. M., Pruessner, J., and Pollak, S. D. (2011). Developmental changes in
adolescents’ neural response to challenge. Dev. Cogn. Neurosci. 1, 560–569. doi:
10.1016/j.dcn.2011.06.006
Telzer, E. H. (2016). Dopaminergic reward sensitivity can promote adolescent
health: a new perspective on the mechanism of ventral striatum activation. Dev.
Cogn. Neurosci. 17, 57–67. doi: 10.1016/j.dcn.2015.10.010
Tognoli, E., and Kelso, J. A. S. (2014). The metastable brain. Neuron 81, 35–48. doi:
10.1016/j.neuron.2013.12.022
van den Bos, W., Rodriguez, C. A., Schweitzer, J. B., and McClure, S. M. (2015).
Adolescent impatience decreases with increased frontostriatal connectivity.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 112, E3765–E3774. doi: 10.1073/pnas.14230
95112
van den Heuvel, M. P., and Sporns, O. (2011). Rich-club organization of the human
connectome. J. Neurosci. 31, 15775–15786. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3539-
11.2011
Vargha-Khadem, F., Gadian, D., Watkins, K., Connelly, A., van Paesschen, W.,
and Mishkin, M. (1997). Differential effects of early hippocampal pathology
on episodic and semantic memory. Science 277, 376–380. doi: 10.1126/science.
277.5324.376
Velanova, K., Wheeler, M. E., and Luna, B. (2008). Maturational changes in
anterior cingulate and frontoparietal recruitment support the development
of error processing and inhibitory control. Cereb. cortex 18, 2505–2522. doi:
10.1093/cercor/bhn012
Vohs, K. D., and Baumeister, R. F. (eds) (2011). Handbook of Self-Regulation.
New York, NY: The Guilford Press.
Willoughby, T., Good, M., Adachi, P. J. C., Hamza, C., and Tavernier, R. (2014).
Examining the link between adolescent brain development and risk taking
from a social-developmental perspective (reprinted). Brain Cogn. 89, 70–78.
doi: 10.1016/j.bandc.2014.07.006
Wolf, M. E., and Ferrario, C. R. (2010). AMPA receptor plasticity in the nucleus
accumbens after repeated exposure to cocaine. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 35,
185–211. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2010.01.013.AMPA
Yarkoni, T., Poldrack, R. A., Van Essen, D. C., and Wager, T. D. (2010).
Cognitive neuroscience 2.0: building a cumulative science of human
brain function. Trends Cogn. Sci. 14, 489–496. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2010.
08.004
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2016 Oron Semper, Murillo and Bernacer. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution
or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 August 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1263
